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Abstract 
How can participating in a liturgy allow us to know God? Recent pathbreaking work on the 
epistemology of liturgy has argued that liturgy allows individuals to gain ritual knowledge of God 
by coming to know how to engage God. However, since liturgy (as it is ordinarily practiced) is a 
group act, I argue that we need to give an account to explain how a group can know God by 
engaging with liturgy. If group know-how is reducible to instances of individual know-how, then 
the existing accounts are sufficient for explaining a group’s knowing how to engage God. 
However, I argue, there are good reasons to suppose that reductive accounts of group know-
how fail. In this paper, I propose a non-reductive account of common ritual knowledge, 
according to which the group knows-how to engage God in liturgy.  
 
Introduction 
One of the most powerful moments in the Church of England’s Eucharistic liturgy occurs as the 
priest reads the words of the Collect (a short prayer usually used after confession and before the 
Liturgy of the Word) over the congregation.1 In this moment, the congregation moves from 
being a collection of individuals, each with their own worries, concerns and questions, to 
becoming a unified community, a community that worships God together. This change is not 
unique to Anglican services, or even to traditions which use only formal written liturgy, either. 
As Stanley Hauerwas describes, the act of gathering ‘indicates that Christians are called from the 
world, from their homes, from their families, to be constituted into a community capable of 
praising God’.23—the very act of gathering together as a community signifies the importantly 
communal dimension of Christian worship and the change that takes place when we worship 
together. This paper seeks to take seriously the theological significance of the communal 
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dimension of Christian worship and to offer a social epistemology of liturgy (however formal or 
informal it may be) in light of this.4  
To give a social epistemology of liturgy, I begin by first considering how liturgy can allow 
us to know God.  As Terence Cuneo has argued, our participation in the liturgy of the Church 
plays an important role in a Christian way of life which is ‘dedicated to engaging God in various 
ways by doing such things as blessing, petitioning, and thanking God’.5 As he goes on to suggest, 
engaging God in this way allows us to gain a kind of ‘ritual knowledge’, which consists in 
knowing how to engage God by means of participating in the repeated acts of blessing, 
petitioning, and thanking God.6  
As I will argue, whilst Cuneo’s position seems entirely plausible, since the emphasis is 
placed only on what an individual can know, his account stops short of providing a social 
epistemology of liturgy.7 To give a social epistemology of liturgy we need an account of what it is 
for a group to know-how to engage God. If group know-how is reducible to individual know-
how, then Cuneo’s account will suffice. However, by building on recent work on group know-
how,8 I argue that there are good reasons to suppose that group know-how is irreducible to 
individual know-how. Lastly, to give an account of how a church can know-how to engage God 
in liturgy, I apply Deborah P. Tollefsen and S. Orestis Palermos’s account of group know-how 
to the context of liturgy.9   
 
Ritual knowledge 
Let us begin by considering what has already been said on the epistemology of liturgy. As James 
K.A. Smith notes, in recent years, there has been something of a ‘liturgical turn’ in the 
philosophy of religion.10 Philosophers of religion are beginning to take note of the importance of 
the practices of religion, and not just the importance of religious doctrine or religious belief. For 
instance, as Sarah Coakley suggests, liturgy can provide us with a kind of knowledge-by-
acquaintance.11 Through repeated practices, we are able to slowly come to see the world 
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differently and are able to develop relationship with God, ‘found in trust and sustained by 
repeated acts of adoration and worship’.12 According to Nicholas Wolterstorff, liturgy provides a 
kind of object-knowledge of God through the repetition of certain forms of address. By taking 
for granted that God is a certain way by addressing him in worship, Wolterstorff thinks, 
participants in a liturgy can come to know what God is like.13 
 One of the most influential of these accounts of liturgical epistemology is Cuneo’s 
account of ‘ritual knowledge’. Cuneo argues that one of the roles of liturgical worship is to 
provide participants with a certain kind of practical knowledge of how to engage God which 
cannot be reduced to propositional knowledge about God; he calls this ‘ritual knowledge’.14 Just 
as knowing another person involves developing a ‘rapport’ with that person in which we come to 
know how to engage that person,15 Cuneo maintains that ‘knowing God consists in (although is 
not exhausted by) knowing how to engage God’.16 Liturgy provides an important means of 
gaining this kind of ritual knowledge. Filling this account out, Cuneo writes,  
 
[L]iturgy makes available act-types of a certain range such as chanting, kissing, 
prostrating, and eating that count in the context of a liturgical performance as cases of 
blessing, petitioning, and thanking God…If this is correct, the liturgy provides the 
materials for not only engaging but also knowing how to engage God. Or more precisely: 
the liturgy provides the materials by which a person can acquire such knowledge and a 
context in which she can exercise or enact it….to the extent that one grasps and 
sufficiently understands these ways of acting, one knows how to bless, petition, and 
thank God in their ritualized forms. One has ritual knowledge.17 
 
On this proposal, it is not that certain bodily acts merely accompany certain speech-acts, but, 
rather, ‘in the context of the liturgy, kissing, prostrating, and eating also count as cases of 
engaging God by blessing, petitioning, and thanking God’.18 
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 Whilst Cuneo’s account is both intuitive and insightful, as I will argue, it does not 
provide an account of what it is for a church to know-how to engage God, but only of what it is 
for an individual to know-how to engage God. Thus, to take seriously the communal dimension 
of Christian worship, we need to provide an account which explains a church’s know-how, that 
is, we need an account not just of ritual knowledge, but also of common ritual knowledge.  
 
Common worship 
Having considered the connection between individual liturgical actions and individual know-
how, it will now be important to consider the importance of collective liturgical actions so that 
we can see their connection to the group’s know-how. In this section, I will make a number of 
brief observations about group liturgical action.  
 First, liturgy ordinarily requires acting together. As the 20th Century Anglo-Catholic 
writer Evelyn Underhill puts it,  
 
Christian worship is never a solitary undertaking. Both on its visible and invisible sides, it 
has a thoroughly social and organic character. The worshipper, however lonely in 
appearance, comes before God as a member of a great family; part of the Communion of 
Saints, living and dead.19  
 
Underhill later suggests that the outward forms of worship in the Church visible should somehow 
reflect the unity of the Church invisible. Thus, in order to provide a ‘here-and-now-embodiment’ 
by which ‘man and women can transcend the apparent isolation of the soul and unite in a 
common act of worship’, Underhill suggests that the visible Church must participate in a number 
of practices which allow this kind of unity of action.20  
Secondly, acting together requires some kind of coordination or plan. In the liturgy, this 
is provided by means of a liturgical script, but the point can be made more generally. As John 
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Searle argues, there is an important difference between actions which are done at the same time 
and actions which are done together. Consider the following case, for instance: 
 
Imagine that a group of people are sitting on the grass in various places in a park. 
Imagine that it suddenly starts to rain and they all get up and run to a common, centrally 
located, shelter. Each person has the intention expressed by the sentence “I am running 
to the shelter.” But for each person, we may suppose that his or her intention is entirely 
independent of the intentions and behavior of others. In this case, there is no collective 
behavior; there is just a sequence of individual acts that happen to converge on a 
common goal. Now imagine a case where a group of people in a park converge on a 
common point as a piece of collective behavior. Imagine that they are part of an outdoor 
ballet where the choreography calls for the entire corps de ballet to converge on a common 
point. We can even imagine that the external bodily movements are indistinguishable in 
the two cases; the people running for shelter make the same types of bodily movements 
as the ballet dancers. Externally observed the two cases are indistinguishable, but they are 
clearly different internally.21 
 
Whilst philosophers have disagreed on just what the nature of such intentions are, they have 
generally agreed that there is a distinction to be made between individual and collective 
intentionality. On Searle’s own analysis, ‘we-intentions’ are an irreducible phenomenon of acting 
together which requires a kind of cooperation between individuals. In contrast to this, Michael 
Bratman thinks that a collective intention is reducible to each individual intending to act 
together, along with the belief that everyone else also has a similar intention.22 Nevertheless, both 
have in common that the intentions of individuals are different in cases of acting together.23 In 
relation to acting together in liturgy this is especially important. As Wolterstorff puts this point, 
‘scripts, in many cases, are very nearly indispensable for acting together.’24 Similarly, as Underhill 
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maintains, the kind of joint action involved in the worship of the Church, depends on our having 
‘an agreed pattern, a liturgy; even though this pattern be of the simplest kind.’25  
Thirdly, whilst a script is important for acting together, acting together also requires 
going beyond a script. As Wolterstorff points out, the presence of a liturgical script cannot 
entirely capture what it is to act together. For instance, he notes, ‘[i]f one person…says the creed 
very slowly and another says it very quickly, they are not saying the creed together’, despite the fact 
that both individuals are following the same script.26 The reason for this, Wolterstorff states, is 
that  
 
the script for enacting a particular liturgy is never fully specified by a text, nor by a text 
supplemented by oral directives. Always some of the prescriptions constituting the script 
are embedded within the social practice of that particular religious community for 
enacting its liturgies.27  
 
This point is developed in more detailed by Bruce Ellis Benson, who thinks of following liturgy 
not as following some orchestral score (as Wolterstorff suggests),28 but, rather, as performing a 
piece of jazz.29 Even in the use of repetitive, scripted liturgy, Benson suggests that each 
performance is different from the last; he notes that ‘there is still a difference between one 
repetition and another, in the same way that there is a difference between one performance of a 
symphony and another’.30 As Benson explains, just as jazz musicians must be well prepared and 
‘know…how to respond to the call of other improvisers’, the same must be the case for 
improvising in liturgical contexts.31 Whilst following a script is important for acting together, 
there must be some level of responsiveness to those one is performing alongside, as well as a 
responsiveness to the norms which are implicit in a community, but which cannot be made 
explicit in a liturgical script. 
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 Finally, acting together requires uniting a set of disparate actors and actions. Whilst it is 
important that a church worships together, this does not mean that all ways of participating must 
be identical. For instance, in his discussion of the epistemology of the rituals described in 
Scripture, Dru Johnson writes that  
 
not only is knowing a social process, but there is an intentional disparity in the 
performance of rites, which means that by its constitution, the Torah does not construct 
an egalitarian epistemology, where everyone has access to the same knowledge—a 
caricatured ideal of rationalism. Rather, because different roles in Israelite society will 
necessarily dispose persons to be variously discerning, they must rely upon each other in 
order to know well.32 
 
As Johnson highlights, one of the remarkable aspects of Hebrew ritual is that it is inclusive of 
children. This inclusivity exists not only for the sake of the children, but also for the sake of 
those who participate alongside children and are led by children in worship.33 Moreover, we 
might think, such inclusivity extends to thinking about the liturgy of the Church today—as 
Benson observes, a worshipping community is composed of ‘multiple voices’,34 which do not 
always provide polyphony, which often remain ‘distinct and sometimes dissonant’.35  
Thus, not only is the liturgical worship of the visible Church communal, scripted and 
partially improvised, but it also brings together difference to be united.  
 
From acting together to knowing together  
We have now seen that liturgy can provide a means of knowing how to engage God via acts of 
blessing, petitioning and thanking God, and we have also seen that liturgy can provide a means 
of acting together. Now, I turn to consider the interaction between these two points.  
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As Johnson outlines, since Hebrew rituals are inherently social in nature, the result is that 
‘[i]n being disposed to know objects, constructs, or God Himself, more than one person is 
required.’36 Similarly, as Wolterstorff describes it, ‘liturgy is like music in that one acquires some 
particular know-how by being inducted into a social practice for the exercise of this know-how. 
There are others who possess the know how in question; liturgical know-how is a shared know-
how.’37 What remains to be seen, however, is how best to analyse the nature of this shared know-
how.  
In this section, I begin by considering the possibility that group know-how is reducible to 
instances of individual know-how. We might think that, in talking of a church’s knowing how to 
engage God by blessing, petitioning and thanking God, we are only saying something about the 
know-how of the individual members of that church. If this reductive account is successful, then 
Cuneo’s account of ritual knowledge is easily extendible to cases of church know-how. However, 
I argue that there are good reasons to think that reductive accounts of group-know-how are not 
successful. 
 First, it is important to note that the phenomenon of a group knowing how to perform 
some action is not unique to the Church; we talk of an orchestra’s knowing how to play a piece 
of music, a scientific research team knowing how to perform experiments and a sports team 
knowing how to win games.38 In all of these cases, it appears that it is the group which knows 
how to perform various actions and not just the individuals—the violin player does not know 
how to perform a symphony any more than the percussion player. Yet, the orchestra does 
appear to know how to perform the symphony. We often praise group performances and award 
orchestras, football teams and companies for their group performances. This implies that, in 
some sense, the group is responsible for acting in a certain way.  
 One natural way of understanding these claims, and, thereby, one way of understanding a 
church’s know-how in corporate liturgy, is to reduce instances of group know-how to instances 
of individual-know-how, or a summation of individual-know-hows. Put simply, an account of 
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group-know-how is reducible to individual know-how if all statements concerning group-know-
how are true in virtue of statements concerning individual know-how.  
As I will argue in this section, a reductive approach does not appear promising. Whilst 
there is not space for a decisive refutation of the reductive approach here, I argue that 
attempting to reduce group know-how to the know-how of the individuals involved leads to a 
number of counter-intuitive consequences. Whilst it might be possible for defenders of reductive 
accounts to simply bite the bullet and accept that how we ordinarily talk about group-know-how 
is mistaken, at the very least, these counter-intuitive consequences provide the motivation for 
looking towards an alternative, non-reductive account. Let us begin, then, by considering two 
different reductive accounts of group-know-how.  
First, we might think that talk of group-know-how is a ‘short-hand’ way of referring to 
the addition of the know-how of each specific individual member of a group.39 If it is possible to 
conceive of group-action as a simple addition of many individual actions, then perhaps we can 
think of group-know-how as the addition of each individual instance of know-how. As Palermos 
and Tollefsen suggest, a case which seems easy to describe in these terms is that of a car 
production line, in which the expertise is distributed in such a way that each individual performs 
her own role, thereby allowing a car, say, a Chevrolet Corvette to be produced. Thus, we might 
think, to say that the Corvette production line knows how to make Corvettes is simply to say 
that John the welder knows how to weld, Mary the painter knows how to paint, and so on. On 
the additive view, group-know-how is identical with the summation of the know-how of each 
specific member. 40  
However, in explaining what the Corvette production line knows by referring only to an 
addition of the know-how of the individuals working on this production line, we must admit that 
strictly speaking, ‘no one knows-how to make a Corvette. Each individual in the company knows 
their own domain but no person knows-how to do all the various things that comprise making 
the Corvette…Corvettes are made but apparently no one knows-how to make them.’41 
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Additionally, although typically credit is given to Chevrolet for the quality of their car 
production, on an additive approach, ‘no one should be given credit because no one knows-how 
to make a Corvette’.42 Even if we focus on individuals with the most expertise in such a process, 
say, the production manager, or the original designer of the car, it is highly unlikely that these 
individuals know-how to make the car since they do not actually make the car themselves, at 
least not entirely. Moreover, focusing on the addition of specific individuals also appears to run 
into further issues. For instance, if group know-how is a summation of specific group members’ 
know-how, then we would have to admit that ‘when Catherine takes a job at Honda, Corvette no 
longer knows-how to make cars.’43 Thus, a straightforward additive reduction appears 
problematic.  
Secondly, then, if we want to make sense of the production line’s know-how whilst 
avoiding these counterintuitive consequences, we might consider a less specific account, which 
attributes group-know-how to general roles rather than specific individuals. For instance, rather 
than think of the production line’s group-know-how as identical to John’s knowing how to weld 
and Mary’s knowing how to paint, we might think that the production line’s know-how is 
identical with some individual’s knowing how to weld and some individual’s knowing how to 
paint.44 What is important for the production line is not Catherine or Mary or John, but, rather, 
the roles that each of these individuals play in the production of the Corvette. Thus, on this view 
‘Corvette knows-how to make a car whenever there is some person in the various positions that 
knows-how to do their job’.45 
 Whilst this view appears more promising, it also runs into problems. On this account, 
when Chevrolet has a position open or loses an employee, they no longer know how to make 
Corvettes. This might seem like an obvious conclusion for some—if the machinery is running, 
all other employees are present and willing to work, it still appears that the production line is no 
longer able to make Corvettes, so we should think that some know-how has gone missing and 
that the production line ceases to have know-how.46 However, this conclusion runs counter to 
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how know-how is usually thought of. When a person breaks her leg, she does not lose the ability 
to run, and when we are asleep we do not lose our knowledge of how to ride bikes—know-how 
appears to be something we retain even when we momentarily lack the capacity to engage in the 
relevant activities. Whilst it is clearly possible to lose one’s know-how in certain cases, 
momentarily being unable to ride a bike or to run does not mean that one ceases to know-how 
to do these things. Analogously, Palermos and Tollefsen suggest, ‘surely we would want to say 
that Corvette still knows-how to make its famous cars, just as we would want to say that 
someone with a broken leg still knows-how to ride a bike’.47 Whilst it is surely possible for 
Chevrolet to cease knowing how to produce Corvettes (we might say, for instance, ‘They just 
don’t know how to make cars like they used to’ after a period of sustained poor quality 
production), losing this know-how as a result of momentarily having a vacancy would seem to be 
a strange conclusion to draw for it would imply that Chevrolet has to relearn how to make cars 
each time they gain a new employee. Yet on the reductive account of group-know-how outlined 
above, group-know-how is identical with the addition of the know-how of some individuals who 
fill various roles within the production line—so if we wish to say Chevrolet still knows how to 
make Corvettes when it has vacancies, we should look elsewhere than some addition of its 
members’ know-how.  
Whilst the move from a reductive account which focuses on specific individuals to one 
which is presented more generally avoids us having to say that the group’s know-how depends 
on some individual’s know-how, it does appear to require that these roles are always filled for the 
group to retain its know-how. On this position know-how appears to be lost very easily in a way 
which does not appear to be the case in individual cases of know-how.  
At this point, the defender of the reductive account might simply bite the bullet and 
admit that companies and production lines lose and gain know-how much more easily than 
individuals. Whilst it is beyond the scope of this paper to decisively reject all versions of the 
reductive account of group know-how, it seems reasonable to think that the intuitions driving 
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the objections above are enough to motivate an alternative position. Moreover, although 
intuitions might vary on whether Corvette retains its know-how when it has vacancies, and there 
may be ways of rescuing the reductive account from these counter-examples, there are more 
general problems with thinking about group-know-how in additive terms. As Palermos and 
Tollefsen note, whilst a straightforward addition of individual know-how seems to capture 
something plausible about the way in which group-know-how functions on a production line, it 
appears less plausible in cases where continuous interaction between group members takes place. 
For instance, in reflecting on the example of an American football team’s acting together, they 
note that,  
  
Players on offense need to know-how to do each of their particular jobs but each of 
those jobs requires an ongoing interaction with others in the team. The play is not a 
result of adding up discrete individual actions or individual know-how regarding these 
actions…Rather, the play itself is constituted by the complex interactions of individuals 
on the team. The performance of a symphony is similar in this respect. I may perform my 
musical instrument very skilfully but the skilled performance of the New York Philharmonic 
requires more than my skilful contribution. My contribution needs to be integrated with 
others’ contributions in a way that produces a collective skilled performance. This type of 
performance seems to emerge from the complex interactions of individual members, 
rendering…[group know-how] irreducibly collective.48  
 
Even if we add up what each individual knows how to do in the context of group action, we 
have yet to give an account of group-know-how; we need to explain how this know-how is 
integrated and combined to produce group action. The point appears to be that whilst individual 
know-how is clearly necessary for a group’s knowing-how in many cases, it is not sufficient.49 We 
also need to say something about the function and structure of the group itself to make sense of 
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attributions of know-how to it. The non-reductive accounts of group-know-how outlined in the 
next section seek to show what else is needed for a group to know-how, above and beyond the 
know-how of each individual member. 
As I described in the previous section, liturgical action is in some sense both scripted and 
improvised. That is, there is a kind of responsiveness and mutual awareness that must take place 
for a group to worship God together. The way in which individual intentions intertwine and 
mesh in such situations is complex. If we want to retain the idea that a church knows how to 
engage God, then we should look beyond reductive accounts of group know-how. In the next 
section, I consider two such accounts. 
 
Group know-how without reduction 
In this section, I outline two ways of thinking about group know-how which are non-reductive, 
before applying these to the context of liturgical worship. In the next section, I will suggest that 
both of these two accounts capture something of what it is for a church to know-how to engage 
God, and so the two accounts should be combined to give an account of common ritual 
knowledge. To recap: to say that group-know-how is non-reductive is simply to say that it cannot 
be explained entirely with reference to the know-how of each individual member of the group.  
First, I will outline an intellectualist account of group know-how. On this account, we 
can avoid giving a reductive account of group know-how by invoking some proposition, known 
by the group, which enables the group to perform together. As such, the group’s knowing-how 
is not reducible only to what we can say about the know-how of each individual group 
member—it also requires that the group knows some proposition which provides a way of 
acting together. On such a proposal, as Palermos and Tollefsen describe it, ‘[t]he individual 
members of the group may know-how to perform their part, but their individual know-how 
depends on and is guided by there being a jointly accepted overall way, W, which is the way to 
perform the overall act of φ’.50  
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To see how this might be the case, let us consider an account of group propositional 
knowledge. On Raimo Tuomela’s account, for instance, for a group to believe some proposition 
is for the operative members (i.e. those in a position to make decisions on behalf of the group, 
such as CEOs, managers and leadership teams) of that group to accept some proposition as true, 
and for the non-operative members of the group to accept and to be aware of the group’s belief. 
Tuomela’s account of belief is formalised as follows:  
 
(Belief of Group) G believes that p in the social and normative circumstances C if and 
only if in C there are operative members A1…Am in G with respective positions P1…Pm 
such that 
(1) the agents A1…Am, when they are performing their social tasks in their positions 
P1…Pm, and due to their exercising the relevant authority system of G, (intentionally) 
jointly accept that p, and because of this exercise of authority system, they ought to 
continue to accept or positionally believe it; 
(2) there is a mutual belief among the operative members to the effect that (1); 
(3) because of (1) the (full-fledged and adequately informed) non-operative members of 
G tend tacitly to accept—or at least ought to accept — p as members of G; and 
(4) there is a mutual belief in G to the effect that (3)51  
 
The group’s justification for this belief, on Tuomela’s account, depends on the members having 
reasons to accept the belief as the belief of the group.52 Thus, if the group believes W, and is 
justified in believing W, then the group knows that W. Note that this analysis of group 
knowledge requires a proposition to be common knowledge amongst the group. Thus, it is not 
sufficient for a group of individuals to happen to all know some proposition at the same time, or 
even for each individual to accept this proposition as the belief of the group. It is also necessary 
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for the group to be aware that this proposition is accepted as the belief of the group by the other 
members.   
Assuming that this analysis of a group’s knowing a proposition (or some other account) 
is plausible, we can see one way of giving a non-reductive account of group know-how. On such 
an account, the members of an orchestra must jointly accept some proposition, W, which 
provides a way of performing some group action. For instance, what is needed for a group to 
know-how to perform Beethoven’s 9th is for each member of the orchestra to know-how to 
perform her own instrument and for the group to accept some proposition, W, which provides a 
way to perform Beethoven’s 9th. Whilst this proposal is reductive on the propositional nature of 
know-how, it is non-reductive on the question of who the agent of such knowledge is—the 
group is the subject that knows of W, that it is the way to perform Beethoven’s 9th, and, in virtue 
of this, the group knows-how to perform that symphony.53 Note that on such an analysis, what 
one individually knows is partly dependent on the role one plays in the group. On Tuomela’s 
account of group belief, not everyone (or in some cases no one) in the group personally believes 
p, but, rather, the operative members determine the group’s belief, and the non-operative 
members need only to accept this belief as the belief of the group. Thus, the account appears 
helpful in capturing cases in which there is a variety of ways of contributing to the group’s 
action. As long as an individual at least tacitly accepts some way of acting, she can contribute to 
the group’s know-how, regardless of her personal beliefs and personal contribution. 
Note, however, that the intellectualist account of group-know-how depends on there 
being some agreed way of performing which the group knows propositionally since for the 
group to know that p, p must be common knowledge to the group’s members. That is, not only 
must the violinist know that p, and the cellist know that p, but also the violinist must know that 
the cellist knows that p and that the cellist knows that the violinist knows that p (and so on). This 
rules out the possibility of using the intellectualist analysis to capture certain cases of group 
performance, since it requires there to be some kind of agreement in place prior to acting. Thus, 
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certain kinds of improvised performance or group actions where there is no prior agreement 
between individuals are difficult to capture in intellectualist terms.54 This is not to say anything 
about the limitations of reducing all instances of know-how to know-that. In the case of 
individual know-how, the intellectualist will surely insist that all instances of know-how, 
regardless of how complex or how difficult to describe in propositional terms, can be reducible 
to instances of knowledge-that.55 The same cannot be said for group-know-how, however. The 
reason for this is that, for some proposition to be known by a group, the proposition has to be 
common knowledge to the members of the group and accepted as the group’s belief by the 
relevant operative and non-operative members. This requires there to be prior understanding of 
a proposition before the group acts. Thus, in the case of improvised or spontaneous 
performance, whilst it might be possible for each individual’s know-how to be summarised 
propositionally (if intellectualism is true), it is not clear how the group’s know-how could be 
known propositionally since there is no prior agreement between individuals that they will act in 
a certain way. The fact that some group performance does not fit the intellectualist account well 
(and as we will see in the next section, some aspects of group liturgical action seem difficult to 
capture on the intellectualist account) provides some motivation for looking to non-
intellectualist accounts of group-know-how.  
Secondly, then, it is possible to give an account of group know-how which does not 
reduce know-how to propositional knowledge. I will refer to this account as the ‘anti-
intellectualist account’. On this account, ‘know-how is a form of disposition or ability, that 
belongs to an intelligent agent, because, when manifested, not only can it be well regulated, but 
also performed in a responsible manner’.56 Thus, assuming know-how is not always reducible to 
know-that, we must provide an account of how groups could be considered intelligent agents 
which have dispositions to act in a certain way. Note again that whilst individuals within the 
group are required to have certain kinds of know-how, what is required in addition to this is 
something about the group (a disposition to act in a certain way in certain circumstances).  
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As with the literature on group belief, the literature on group agency is considerable.57 
Many of the positions developed in this literature seek to give an account of how groups, 
constituted by individual members, could be considered agents in their own right. Often, this 
requires taking a certain functionalist stance on what it is to be an agent. For instance, as Peter 
French describes it, agents must display a level of rationality (i.e., they must have a reason for 
acting), and they must be able to respond to feedback and adjust their actions accordingly.58 
Similarly, Christian List and Phillip Pettit suggest that an agent must have ‘representational states, 
motivational states, and a capacity to act on their basis’.59 By examining the decision-making 
processes of groups, whether that be through some hierarchical structure, a dictatorship, or an 
egalitarian voting process, both French and List and Pettit suggest that groups can meet the 
conditions for agency. Thus, if groups can be considered intelligent agents capable of performing 
certain actions, we ought to consider them capable of knowing how to perform these actions. 
 Yet, whilst such account might provide some explanation of how groups can be 
considered agents, as Tollefsen argues elsewhere, what is lacking from such accounts is an 
explanation of how groups could be regarded as having mental states and engaging in cognitive 
processes.60 Palermos and Tollefsen attempt to provide such an account by appealing to the 
literature on distributed cognition. As they explain,  
 
In order to claim that two (or more) systems give rise to some distributed process and, 
thereby, to an overall distributed system…we need to establish that the contributing 
parts are non-linearly related to each other on the basis of continuous reciprocal interactions 
between them. …in order to have an overall distributed cognitive system—as opposed to 
merely several individual cognitive systems that are socially embedded…the requirement 
is that the contributing members…collaboratively perform a cognitive task by interacting 
continuously and reciprocally with each other.61 
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Put simply, an account of distributed cognition is required when the interactions between group 
members cannot be straightforwardly divided into individual cognition. For instance, as we saw 
previously, an orchestra’s performing of a symphony is not merely a case of violin players 
knowing how to read the violin score and percussionists knowing how to read the percussion 
score—there must be a level of interaction and responsiveness to one another’s performance. 
On Palermos and Tollefsen’s account, this kind of distributed cognitive system requires that ‘the 
contributing members (i.e., the relevant cognitive agents) collaboratively perform a cognitive task 
by interacting continuously and reciprocally with each other.’62  
It is important to note that not all behaviour which might potentially be identified as 
cognitive in this way will meet the conditions for group action. For instance, a random group of 
individuals might all individually be proficient at playing jazz instruments, and happen, 
momentarily to play a piece of jazz music harmoniously.63 While such an example might appear 
to be a case of group know-how, the reason that it should not be considered as such, Palermos 
and Tollefsen suggest, is that ‘[t]he relevant behaviour needs to instead rise out of the cooperative 
and (thereby) self-regulatory activity of some appropriate collection of units that will allow it to 
be (at least potentially) regular behavior’.64 Thus, they think, ‘in order for them to qualify as a jazz 
band, they must regularly be in tune and in synch, and for that to be the case, every player’s 
performance must be continuously interdependent to everyone else’s’.65  
If groups are organised in the relevant way, it is possible that group know-how might 
emerge. In contrast to a kind of reductive additive account of group know-how, then, the non-
reductive non-intellectualist account holds that group know-how is an emergent property of 
groups which have a certain functional role. On this account, group know-how emerges,  
 
[w]hen individual members coordinate on the basis of reciprocal interactions, they adapt 
mutually to each other by restricting their actions in such a way so as to reliably—that is, 
regularly—achieve ends that they would only luckily—if ever—bring about were they to 
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act on their own. Via the application of such positive mutual constrains, which result 
from, and further guide, the members’ coordinated activity, new collective properties 
(i.e., regular behaviors) emerge and the collective achieves a stable configuration that is 
necessary for successful operation.66 
 
Thus, just as the intellectualist account depends on providing some plausible account of group 
knowledge, the non-intellectualist account depends on providing some plausible account of 
distributed cognition. Whilst filling out both of these positions is not within the scope of this 
paper, the bare bones of both accounts should be sufficient to see how an account of common 
ritual knowledge might develop.  
 
Common ritual knowledge 
We are now in a position to consider an account of group know-how which can help fill out an 
account of common ritual knowledge.  
As we have seen, there are reasons to suppose that liturgical worship requires group 
actions for which there is a diversity of participants and ways of participating. Furthermore, we 
have also seen that we should regard the community as the agent of the action of engaging God, 
and not just the individual participants. Thus, if group know-how is truly non-reductive, then we 
must look to explain the nature of acting liturgically with reference to a non-reductive account of 
group know-how. Let us consider the possibility of such an application with reference to the two 
accounts outlined above. 
 First, the application of an intellectualist account of group know-how, according to 
which a group accepts some proposition as a way of acting, has some promise in the context of 
liturgy. As Wolterstorff highlights, the presence of a script in the context of group action allows 
for the possibility of correct or incorrect performance of some group action, by reference to how 
well a script is followed.67 In part, Wolterstorff notes, performing some group action correctly is 
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a matter of suspending acting on one’s own judgement ‘as to what would be good to do and 
instead follow the script.’68 He continues, ‘[w]e are all, in fact, rule-submissive and script-submissive 
selves; nobody is a purely autonomous self. We all act heteronomously’.69 
 The kind of correctness rules which Wolterstorff refers to here can be captured well by 
thinking of a church’s group know-how as a mutually accepted way of acting. In the context of a 
sports team’s acting, for instance, this account appears to capture much of what it is to act 
together. To be committed to a certain team with certain values is a commitment to a certain 
way of playing. Playing for Manchester United, for instance, might bring with it a commitment 
to playing attacking, fast paced football (although perhaps less so in recent seasons). 
Furthermore, following the instructions of a coach in performing some manoeuvre on the pitch 
might also be captured by commitment to a joint way of playing— for instance, Jose Mourinho 
might specify that a free kick is to be taken in a certain way, outlining the roles of each particular 
player. Performing this manoeuvre correctly requires successfully adhering to Mourinho’s 
instructions. More generally, as Palermos and Tollefsen describe, ‘team members need to be 
explicitly committed to act as parts of the team, such that their behaviour will mesh with the 
actions of the other members.’70  
 It is easy to see how this account might be extended to think about acting together in 
following a liturgical script—in belonging to a church or a particular tradition, we are committing 
to some particular way of performing liturgy and thereby to some particular way of engaging 
God. Moreover, as we have seen, commitment to worshipping together does appear to require 
some explicit commitment to acting as part of a group. The use of plural pronouns in a liturgical 
script (e.g. ‘We believe in God the Father…’ is used in the recitation of the creed) is one example 
of how the script reinforces our commitment to acting together in liturgy.71 Thus, assuming 
Tuomela’s (or some other plausible alternative) can capture a church’s knowledge of a 
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proposition, then this account can provide some explanation of what it is for a church to know-
how to engage God in worship.  
 If all that took place in group liturgical actions were following a script, then the 
intellectualist account might suffice for an account of common ritual knowledge. But it is not all 
that takes place. As we have seen, there are some actions which can’t be specified by the script, 
and a level of liturgical improvisation and mutual responsiveness which is crucial to acting 
together. Palermos and Tollefsen suggest that in the context of acting together in a sports team, 
for instance, whilst there may be some joint commitment to a way of playing which can be 
captured by a shared-commitment to a way of performing, this cannot capture all that the group 
knows how to do. They note that, 
 
a number of studies also indicate that certain forms of joint action and…[group know-
how], such as interpersonal rhythmic coordination, can spontaneously emerge on the 
basis of dynamical process interaction—without the further need, on the part of the 
individual members to take up any intellectualist commitments….[Intellectualist 
commitments] prevent the behaviour of the individual members of the team from 
deviating from the individual behaviour that is required for the team to coordinate—or, 
perhaps somewhat more weakly, intellectualist commitments disallow team members to 
engage in behaviour that would prevent the team from acting in a sufficient coordinated 
manner.72  
Their point, put simply, is that not all group actions require commitment to a way of playing. 
Some group-level behaviour emerges through repeated performance without prior agreement. 
Yet, as we have seen the intellectualist account depends on there being prior agreement to some 
way of acting. Moreover, even in cases in which such commitment already exists (such as in 
sports teams), intellectualist commitments appear to function as necessary requirements for 
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group action, but not sufficient requirements. There is more to following Mourinho’s plan for 
enacting some new manoeuvre in taking a free-kick than remembering all of the relevant 
instructions, and there is more to performing an orchestral symphony than correctly reading 
one’s own part of the score and knowing that the group is committed to playing the symphony 
in a certain way. Such commitments might provide helpful parameters to the group’s 
performance in these two cases, but what is required for correctly performing both actions is a 
mutual awareness of the relevant group members and an ability to self-correct when things go 
wrong.  
In the context of liturgy, the script can provide the correctness rules for performing a 
certain liturgy, and a certain way of engaging God. Yet, if there is some element of going beyond 
the script or improvising from the script, then the intellectualist account won’t be sufficient for 
providing an account of common ritual knowledge. The intellectualist account might provide the 
necessary conditions for acting together, but it cannot provide the sufficient conditions. Thus, 
there is need to give an account of the group cognition which arises from the complex 
engagement between church members in liturgy, which cannot be reduced to a propositional 
way of acting.  
 In earlier work I have suggested that in thinking of the church’s actions in worship, we 
should appeal not only to the collective intentions of church members, but also to how they 
might act as a group agent. Building on the account of agency developed by List and Pettit 
(summarized in the previous section), I noted that  
 
the organizational structure of a church will depend, in part, on one’s tradition, but it 
seems clear that a member of a church, by participating in the reading of liturgical scripts 
and singing hymns can act on behalf of the group in a manner analogous to a member of 
a trade union acting on behalf of a group by standing on a picket line. Note that these 
kinds of actions might be performed through acts of... [collective intentionality], such as 
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the singing of the liturgical script, but we might also include many other actions as 
instances of playing an active role in a group. Just as organizations need both sub-
committees and expert individuals to contribute to the actions of the group, the 
individual actions of neuro-atypical individuals could rightly be considered as playing an 
active role in the actions of the group.73 
 
I then develop this account to suggest that, as long as one is licensed appropriately by the 
operative members of the group, one could contribute to the church’s actions in a number of 
different ways. For instance, ‘in the case of an individual with ASD who experiences a 
heightened spiritual awareness, such an individual might in turn lead other individuals in the 
congregation to a heightened awareness of the presence of God, and thereby, in turn, contribute 
to the collective actions of the group.’74 Thinking of the church as an agent which is capable of 
acting is helpful for thinking about how the church might know-how to engage God.  
 Moving beyond an account of church agency, to thinking about a church’s distributed 
cognition, we must suppose that in performing some liturgical script, members coordinate their 
actions and mutually adapt to one another’s actions to produce reliable ends. This kind of 
interaction is not merely a matter of following instruction, but it also requires a kind of 
responsiveness to how the other members of the congregation follow this instruction. Thinking 
about the question of self-regulation will be helpful here. In the case of a jazz band performing, 
for instance, ‘the drummer could give visual or even verbal hints to the trombonist that he’s lost 
his concentration and that he fails to follow the band’s rhythm, despite her best attempts to 
“bring her back”’75 In such a situation, so long as the drummer is brought back into the rhythm of 
the band, the interactivity between the trombonist and the drummer allows the group to self-
regulate in such a way that it performs the piece correctly.  
This kind of interactivity must take place within a church community too. An excellent 
example of how this interactivity and self-correction might take place (against the backdrop of a 
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scripted way of performing) can be found in Benson’s description of his visit to Saint Gregory of 
Nyssa Episcopal Church in San Francisco: 
 
the service begins…with a prayer, some announcements, and yet another welcome to 
everyone. Then the cantor…casually explains how the service will go. He sings the 
melody of the first piece of music…giving the congregation a brief chance to practice 
and become comfortable with the music…Although there is a choir, the choir members 
are interspersed throughout the congregation – which means that wherever you’re 
standing, nearby is a good singer whom you can count on for help….after the 
service…those involved in the service disappear to spend five minutes discussing what 
went well in the service and what could be improved…one remarkable thing about the 
worship at Saint Gregory’s is that it feels so spontaneous. And yet it is actually highly 
scripted. In other words, it achieves what less liturgical churches often hope to achieve—
a sense of openness, spontaneity, and lack of formality, and the sense that the Holy Spirit 
is alive in guiding the worship. But it does so by very closely following a script, one that 
gets modified on the basis of […] short meetings after each service.76 
 
As Benson highlights here, St Gregory’s engagement with God is both scripted and spontaneous. 
They are committed to a way of acting and engaging God which is made possible both by a 
written script, as well as by the instructions of the cantor. But they are also involved in a 
complex, higher-level group action in which members of the group are constantly interacting 
with one another, allowing the group to self-regulate their actions in liturgy. This is achieved by 
strategic placement of the choir, which helps the group to self-correct when members of the 
group veer from the pitch of the group, but also by the reflection on the content and 
performance of the script in the short after service meetings. If Palermos and Tollefsen are right, 
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then the know-how that emerges in a context like this is not reducible to what each individual 
knows, but it is only analyzable by looking at the group’s performance.  
Indeed, that acting together in liturgy requires more than a commitment to a way of 
acting, can be observed by noting that worshipping as part of a community is something which is 
acquired by repeated engagement and not just by grasping some theoretical fact. As Smith puts 
this point, there is a kind of irreducible ‘logic of practice’ involved in being part of a ritual 
community, which resists propositional reduction.77 He suggests that 
 
natives—that is, practitioners, “unselfconsciously” embedded in a community of 
practice—are not primarily theorists. They are not “thinking” their way through the 
world; they are not reflecting on what they’re doing—which is precisely why any 
adequate interpretation of what’s going on in such a community of practice will need to 
resist the temptation to construe practitioners as implicit theorizers.78 
 
This seems right. Belonging to a liturgical community is something which takes time and 
repeated practice. One way of describing why this is the case, is in reference to the kind of 
improvisation that takes place in liturgical worship—as we have seen, performing a liturgy is not 
simply reciting a script. In learning how to belong and act in such a community, one is also 
learning to contribute to the group as an agent.  
As Palermos and Tollefsen admit, many cases of group action will involve both a kind of 
intellectualist group know-how in which a group accepts a proposition, and a kind of non-
intellectualist group know-how in which participation in a complex group interaction gives rise 
to emergent cognitive states. As we have seen, whilst a sports team’s commitment to a certain 
way of playing might account, to some extent, for the group know-how of the sports team, it 
cannot account for all aspects of the group’s performance. Similarly, I have suggested, whilst a 
commitment to a certain way of acting liturgically might partially capture what it is for a church 
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to know-how to engage God, it cannot capture this entirely. What is required, is an account of 
how individuals coordinate and interact in such a way that the group functions as an agent, and 
thereby group know-how emerges in the complex interactions of the group members. A helpful 
way to summarise how these two accounts might interact can be found in Underhill’s discussion 
of the tensions of ‘habit’ and ‘attention’ in Christian worship:  
 
Habit and attention must therefore co-operate in the life of worship; and it is a function 
of cultus to maintain this vital partnership. Habit alone easily deteriorates into 
mechanical repetition, the besetting sin of the liturgical mind. Attention alone means, in 
the end, intolerable strain. Each partner has his weak point. Habit tends to routine and 
spiritual red-tape; the vice of the institutionalist. Attention is apt to care for nothing but 
the experience of the moment, and ignore the need of a stable practice, independent of 
personal fluctuations; the vice of the individualist. Habit is a ritualist. Attention is a 
pietist. But it is the beautiful combination of order and spontaneity, docility and freedom, 
living humbly—and therefore fully and freely—within the agreed pattern of the cultus 
and not in defiance of it, which is the mark of a genuine spiritual maturity and indeed the 
fine flower of a worshipping life.79  
 
Conclusion 
If ritual knowledge is acquired by means of an individual’s engaging God by blessing, thanking 
and petitioning God, then common ritual knowledge is acquired by means of a church’s 
engaging God by blessing, thanking and petitioning God. To perform these liturgical actions 
together, we must follow a script closely, but yet remain aware of the other members of the 
community. If we wish to claim (as Wolterstorff does) that ‘[t]he church blesses God, praises 
God, thanks God…It’s not the individual members who do these things simultaneously; it’s the 
assembled body that does these things’’,80 then we need some account not only of ritual 
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knowledge but also of common ritual knowledge. If we are reductive about group know-how, 
then it cannot be true that the church knows how to worship God, but, rather, we have to admit, 
each individual member knows how to engage God, and together these acts constitute a church’s 
worship. Such a reduction looks problematic for both theological and philosophical reasons. 
Thus, as I have suggested, we should look to a non-reductive account of group know-how.  
 On this account, the church knows how to act by means of (i) its group knowledge of 
some proposition which summarises some way of acting together in the liturgy, and (ii) its acting 
together to form a group agent capable of emergent cognitive states and a disposition to engage 
God. Acting together in this second way requires a mutual-awareness of each other, as well as an 
ability for the group to self-correct when its actions go wrong.  
 There is clearly much more work to be done both in social epistemology and on the 
philosophy of liturgy. Much of what I have been exploring in this article pushes at the limits of 
what analytic theology and philosophy of religion has explored, and one notable area of silence 
from philosophers and analytic theologians is that of ecclesiology. If we want to say that the 
Church engages God or that the Church knows how to engage God, then to properly advance 
the discussion of liturgy, we must think more carefully about just what the Church is.81  
 
 
 
 
Joshua Cockayne, University of St Andrews.  
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Notes 
1 As Paul Bradshaw notes in the companion to the Church of England’s Common Worship, in using the collect, ‘the 
ministry of the president serves to unify the liturgy and draw the community into a worshipping community, 
Companion to Common Worship, 114. 
2 Hauerwas, In Good Company, 157.  
3 This emphasis on the Church’s gathering from a variety of spheres of society is discussing in detail by Smith 
(Desiring the Kingdom, 159-166). 
4 I use ‘liturgy’ in a broad sense to denote any scripted communal worship.  
5 Ritualized Faith, 148.  
6 Ritualized Faith, 163.  
7 We can distinguish between at least two kinds of groups in reference to the Church. The Church as a whole is 
constituted by globally and historically distant gathered churches, who are united together by the work of the Holy 
Spirit. Within this group, we can also describe the worship of a gathered church as a group action which individuals 
participate in.  
8 Palermos and Tollefsen, ‘Group know-how’.  
9 Palermos and Tollefsen, ‘Group know-how’.  
10 Smith, ‘Review of Ritualized Faith’, 118. For a more detailed summary of the recent literature on liturgy and 
epistemology see Cockayne, ‘Philosophy and Liturgy Part 2’.  
11 Coakley, ‘Beyond Belief’.  
12 Coakley, ‘Beyond Belief’, 340. 
13 ‘Knowing God Liturgically’, 14-15. 
14 Ritualized Faith, 162.  
15 Cuneo, Ritualized Faith, 148-49. This claim is also confirmed by those discussing the philosophy of personal 
knowledge, more generally. Bonnie M. Talbert, for instance, argues that 
 
to know another is to know how to successfully interact with him/her over time. Knowing how to interact 
with a particular person starts with the largely ineffable ability to recognize him/her, which recognition 
comes to be associated with a more complex mental representation of that individual…Our interactive 
skills are largely intuitive and difficult to express in propositional terms. For example, when I am talking to 
Shannon, I find that I pace my remarks differently than I do when I am talking to Deme. Without thinking 
about it I seem to adjust the pace of my conversation to what I somehow perceive is most suitable to the 
interaction. (Talbert, ‘Knowing Other Persons’, 196-197) 
 
16 Cuneo, Ritualized Faith, 149. 
17 Cuneo, Ritualized Faith, 163. 
18 Cuneo, Ritualized Faith, 156. Cuneo attempts to stay relatively neutral on the disagreement between intellectualism 
(the thesis that knowledge-how can be reduced to knowledge-that)  and anti-intellectualism (the thesis that it is not 
the case that all knowing-how is a species of knowing that) by giving some considerations in favour of what he 
describes as a ‘moderate view’ (Ritualized Faith, 151). As he describes this view, knowing how is ‘a sequence of act 
types that an agent can perform’, such as ‘[p]erforming a work of music, swimming the crawl…and offer[ing] thanks 
to God’ (Ritualized Faith, 151).  
19 Worship, 81. As Underhill stresses, the worship of the Church has both a visible and an invisible component. Both of 
these components are social in character. To think about the actions of the Church invisible would require much 
more careful theological work than there is space for. Here I focus only on the corporate actions of the Church 
visible. 
20 Worship, 93.  
21 Searle, ‘Collective Intentions and Actions’, 403-404. 
22 Bratman, ‘Shared Agency’, 43-49. 
23 Both Searle’s and Bratman’s analyses have also been applied to explain acting liturgically. For instance, Cuneo 
suggests that Searle’s analysis of collective action can be used to explain the actions involved in liturgical singing 
(Cuneo, Ritualized Faith, 138.), and Wolterstorff suggests that reading a liturgical script together requires a kind of 
‘interlocking’ and ‘meshing’ of individual intentions in the way described by Bratman (Acting Liturgically, 61.). Just as 
the choreography of the corps de ballet is essential for forming the kind of we-intentions required for performing a 
ballet together, the liturgical script (or at least some agreed pattern of worship) is essential for being able to worship 
God together.  
24 Wolterstorff, Acting Liturgically, 15.  
25 Worship, 99. 
26 Acting Liturgically, 64. 
27 Acting Liturgically, 20. 
                                                 
 31 
                                                                                                                                                       
28 The God We Worship, 7. 
29 Benson, Liturgy as a Way of Life, 41. 
30 Benson, Liturgy as a Way of Life, 141 
31 Benson, Liturgy as a Way of Life, 41. 
32 Johnson, Knowledge by Ritual, 246. 
33 In recent work, I make a similar point with reference to participating in liturgy alongside those with Autism 
Spectrum Disorder. I suggest that an account of group liturgical action cannot be defined only with reference to 
neuro-typical individuals, who can interlock their intentions without difficulty, but it must also be inclusive of those 
who cannot form we-intentions. (Cockayne, ‘Inclusive Worship’). 
34 Benson, Liturgy as a Way of Life, 94. 
35 Benson, Liturgy as a Way of Life, 94. 
36 Johnson, Knowledge by Ritual, 245. 
37 The God we Worship, 7-8. Wolterstorff introduces this discussion of shared know-how in The God We Worship but it 
is not developed into an account of group know-how. The closest Wolterstorff gets to discussing group-know- is in 
his recent work on liturgy in which he discusses the role of collective intentionality in acting together in liturgy 
(Acting Liturgically, 61-65). The epistemological implications of this account of collective intentionality in liturgy are 
not discussed in detail by Wolterstorff.  
38 Palermos and Tollefsen, ‘Group Know How’, 112.  
39 Palermos and Tollefsen, ‘Group Know-How’, 114-115. 
40 As Palermos and Tollefsen formalise the additive definition of group-know-how:  
‘A(KH) + B (KH) + C (KH) … = G—KH’ (116). 
41 Palermos and Tollefsen, ‘Group Know-How’, 115. 
42 Palermos and Tollefsen, ‘Group Know-How’, 115. 
43 ‘Group Know-How’, 116. 
44 As they formalise this second position: ‘p(KH) + q(KH) + r (KH)…= G(KH)…where p, q, r… represent some 
individual rather than any specific individual’ (116).  
45 ‘Group Know-How’, 116.  
46 With thanks to the editor for articulating this objection so clearly. 
47 ‘Group Know-How’, 116.  
48 ‘Group Know-How’, 117.  
49 As Palermos and Tollefsen highlight, the irreducibility of group know-how is also attested to by work in cognitive 
science. For instance, Cook et al. note, 
 
The term “cognition” used in the team context refers to cognitive processes or activities that occur at a 
team level. Like the cognitive processes of individuals, the cognitive processes of teams include learning, 
planning, reasoning, decision making, problem solving, remembering, designing, and assessing situations 
[...]. Teams are cognitive (dynamical) systems in which cognition emerges through interactions. (‘Interactive 
team cognition’, 256) 
 
50 Palermos and Tollefsen, ‘Group Know-How’, 118-119. 
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